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From the Law of Nations to Transnational
Law: Why We Need a New Basic Course
for the International Curriculum
Mathias Reimann*
The purpose of this essay is to call for a significant change in the
international law curriculum. For decades, the introduction to, and the
basis of, that curriculum has been the established international law
course.' Today, we should no longer use it for that objective but teach it
at a truly advanced level. We should introduce students to the
international curriculum in a course that provides a more comprehensive
* Hessel E. Yntema Professor of Law; Dr. iur., University of Freiburg 1982;
LL.M., University of Michigan 1983. For their comments on an earlier draft, I thank
Reuven Avi-Yonah, Karima Bennoune, Tim Dickinson, Daniel Halberstam, Jim
Hathaway, Joel Samuels, and particularly Eric Stein whose criticism was, once again, the
most trenchant. Thanks also to Carsten Hoppe for prompt and valuable research
assistance.
1. My characterization of this course draws on three sources. First, it rests on a
survey of a broad range of American casebooks, in particular: CHRISTOPHER BLAKESLEY,
ET. AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (5th ed. 2001); BARRY CARTER, ET. AL.,
INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 2003); ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL LAW
COURSEBOOK (1999); LORI FISLER DAMROSCH, ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND
MATERIALS (4th ed. 2001); JEFFREY DUNOFF, ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS,
ACTORS, PROCESS (2002); MARK JANIS & JOHN NOYES, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2d ed.
2001); JORDAN J. PAUST, ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S.
(2000); WILLIAM R. SLOMANSON, FUNDAMENTAL PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2d ed. 1995). Second, it takes into account the scope and contents of the basic books
written for students taking this course, especially: DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL
LAW FRAMEWORKS (2001); THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, ET. AL., PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN A NUTSHELL (3d ed. 2002); MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
(4th ed. 2003). I have also consulted several more extensive works that are in use in the
United States, particularly: IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
(5th ed. 1998); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001); OPPENHEIM'S
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); OSCAR
SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1991). Third, I have relied
on information obtained from colleagues who have taught the course on a regular basis.
I realize that there are considerable variations among the courses offered and I
discuss some of them below. See infra, Section III. Yet, while there is, strictly speaking,
no such thing as the international law course, there are sufficient commonalities shared
by virtually all such courses to allow a fairly general characterization.
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overview of the global legal order. Such a course needs to be
developed.2
My thesis is developed in four steps that trace an evolution over the
last half-century. Part I takes a look at the situation fifty years ago when
American law schools began to develop a substantial international law
curriculum. At that time, international law was taught in what I will call
the classic style, i.e., almost purely as the law of nations. Arguably, this
was an acceptable basis for the international curriculum in a world in
which public international law faced little serious competition from
related areas, presented a fairly orderly picture, and was marked by
distinct boundaries. Part II shows that we no longer live in such a world
and outlines the changes that have occurred in the meantime. Over the
last few decades, we have witnessed the rise to prominence of many
other international subjects, a growing complexity of the international
scene, as well as an increased blurring of the lines between public
international law and other fields. Part III then considers whether, under
current conditions, the international law course can still serve as a
general. introduction. Despite the fact that the basic course today
incorporates many of the developments described, the answer should be
no. The course still presents too limited, lopsided, and artificially
isolated a view of the global legal order to serve as the principal basis of
the international curriculum. In conclusion, part IV suggests the creation
of a new basic course that adequately reflects the breadth, diversity, and
interrelatedness of current international legal issues. The most
appropriate title for such a course could be Transnational Law.
I hope that some of those who teach in the international law arena
will agree with me. They should then convince their institutions to
follow the University of Michigan Law School's example and implement
the changes outlined here. 3 I am sure that many others in the field,
2. There is substantial literature on international law teaching, but as far as I can
see, it does not squarely address the issue discussed here. See, e.g., JOHN KING GAMBLE,
THE TEACHING OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE 1990S (1993); John King Gamble,
Roundtable on the Teaching of International Law, 85 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 102
(1991); David Kennedy, International Legal Education, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 361 (1985);
Daniel Turp, Reexamination of the Teaching of International Law, 78 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L.
PROC. 198 (1984) (workshop proceedings).
3. The University of Michigan Law School introduced a new introductory course,
entitled Transnational Law, in 2001. It became mandatory beginning with the class of
2004 (entering law school in the fall of 2001), and was described for our alumni in an
article I wrote in 2003 for Law Quadrangle Notes. Mathias Reimann, Taking
Globalization Seriously: Michigan Breaks New Ground by Requiring the Study of
Transnational Law, 46 L. QUADRANGLE NOTES 54 (2003) (on file with Penn State
International Law Review). A somewhat abbreviated version of the article is reprinted in
82 MICH. B.J. 52 (2003) (on file with Penn State International Law Review). For
comments on this innovation, see Jeffrey Atik & Anton Soubbout, International Legal
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especially many seasoned teachers of public international law, will
disagree. Yet, they should not adhere to the status quo by simple force of
habit but defend the current position of the traditional course with
arguments refuting mine. If this results in a discussion about the need for
a new introduction to the international curriculum, this essay has served
its purpose.
I. The Classic Model: The Law of Nations
Fifty years ago, interest in international affairs was high after the
cataclysm of World War II, the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and the
foundation of the United Nations. When money from the Ford
Foundation began lavishly to fund international legal studies programs,
American law schools set out to develop a more substantial international
law curriculum.4
At that time, international law was conceived of, and taught in, what
I call the classic model. 5 For present purposes, three features of this
approach are particularly important: It dealt only with a limited subset of
international legal issues; it presented a fairly simple legal order; and it
portrayed a field with well-defined boundaries. 6 Let us look at these
three features in turn. The classic approach covered only part of the law
beyond national boundaries because it defined the topic in fairly narrow
terms. It conceived of international law in a literal, Benthamite, sense:
as inter-national law, i.e. the law existing inter nationes as sovereigns.
7
Thus, it was primarily concerned with the basic features of the
"Westphalian order" 8 as modified over time. Originally, it focused only
Education, 36 INTL. LAWYER 715, at 717-718 (2003); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Notes from
the President, Am. Soc'Y INT'L L. NEWSL., March/April 2002, at 4; Sandra Day
O'Connor, Keynote Address (March 13-16, 2002) in 96 AM. SoC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 348,
352 (2002).
4. See, e.g., ELIZABETH G. BROWN, LEGAL EDUCATION AT MICHIGAN 1859-1959, at
143-46 (1959).
5. This approach is embodied in the literature of that time. See, e.g., WILLIAM
BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1953); J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF
NATIONS (5th ed. 1955); EDWIN DICKINSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1950); MANLEY HUDSON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
(3d ed. 1951); LESTER ORFIELD & EDWARD D. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1955).
6. All this was less true in an earlier period, especially in the nineteenth century
when international law was still more broadly conceived to encompass both public
relationships (among states) and private entitlements (among individuals). See, e.g.,
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 4-10, 19-37 (1834).
7. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 296 (1970).
8. The system of sovereign nation states created by the Peace of Westphalia (the
peace treaties of Minster and Osnabriick in Germany) that ended the Thirty-Years-War
in 1648. See CASSESE, supra note 1, at 21.
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on the world of sovereign and formally co-equal nation states who make,
follow or violate international law, and who sometimes arbitrate or
litigate in international tribunals. Around the middle of the twentieth
century, two important elements were added: permanent international
organizations and international human rights. Despite this addition,
however, the coverage of the classic model remained strictly limited to
public international law. Consequently, it excluded private international
law, not only in the narrow sense of conflict of laws but also in the
broader sense of all rules pertaining to transboundary transactions and
disputes between private parties, be they individuals or business
organizations. In other words, international law under the classic model
was, at its core, The Law of Nations9 as actors on the world stage.
Second, classic international law presented a relatively
uncomplicated and internally consistent picture of the international legal
order. By restricting itself to the public law elements, it focused on a
limited range of actors, sources, principles, and dispute resolution
mechanisms. In terms of actors, it dealt primarily with states and
eventually with the United Nations as their principal organization;
individuals played a marginal role at best and other actors, such as non-
governmental entities, received virtually no attention. The sources
considered were those listed in article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (treaties, customary international law,
general principles, judicial decisions, and the opinions of leading
scholars) and perhaps soft-law in the form of UN resolutions or the like.
As far as the basic principles are concerned, classic public international
law typically addressed state sovereignty and its consequences,
international comity, and the major bases for international jurisdiction, as
well as the immunity of states and their representatives. Its coverage of
dispute resolution mechanisms centered around the procedure before the
International Court of Justice though it often included arbitration of
disputes between states. While all this amounted to a rather full plate,
the whole menu was decisively and intentionally state centered.
Finally, the classic view saw public international law as a subject
with well-defined boundaries. This is particularly true in two regards.
First, the approach assumed that there is a clear distinction between
public and private international law. As mentioned, it concerned itself
only with the former and did not address private transactions and
disputes across international boundaries. Second, it presumed a
9. This was indeed the more traditional title. See, e.g., BRIERLY, supra note 5. It is
still the common title in German (Vdlkerrecht). See, e.g., ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO
SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT (3d ed. 1984). The notion persists today, albeit in
modified form. See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 22:3
2004] FROM THE LAW OF NATIONS TO TRANSNATIONAL LAW 401
fundamental difference between international and domestic law. Hence
it addressed the basic relationship between the two spheres (monism and
dualism) and discussed whether and how international law becomes
effective within certain domestic legal systems.
At the time, a good case could be made that a public international
law course with such contents and characteristics should serve as the
basis for the international curriculum. The most important argument for
that proposition is that fifty years ago, the law of nations was probably
the single most relevant topic in international legal studies. Most related
subjects either had not yet fully developed, as was the case with human
rights and international trade, or had yet to come into existence at all,
such as European Community law. To be sure, private international law
had existed for centuries. Yet, even this area was arguably of lesser
importance. Transboundary transactions and disputes among private
parties were still relatively rare and most practitioners never faced them.
Thus there was no urgent need to train the majority of future attorneys
and judges in this regard. It was therefore not unreasonable that
international law teaching was aimed at those future lawyers who would
have a need for it: lawyers working for governments or international
organizations whose primary concern was, of course, not private but
public international law.
In addition, public international law was a fairly suitable basis for
the international curriculum because it was still a rather limited field that
could be covered in reasonable depth in a two- or three-credit-hour
course. It also presented a relatively self-contained system that could
thus be understood with limited reference to other areas, especially
private international and domestic law. All this has changed in the last
fifty years.
II. The Winds of Change: The Expansion and Diversification of
International Law
It is no longer news that in the last half-century, the global legal
order has undergone enormous change.10 In the present context, three
developments are particularly noteworthy. First, numerous fields lying
beyond the traditional law of nations have developed, matured, and
become important in practice. Second, the world legal order has become
more diversified and complex. Third, the boundaries between public
international law and other areas have blurred or broken down. Here, we
will simply describe these developments and leave for later to what
extent current international law teaching takes them into account.
10. On the changes described below, see also Harald Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2604-05, 2624-31 (1997).
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1. The Rise of Other Areas
Of the many areas that have risen to prominence in the last couple
of decades, some belong in the realm of public international law, some
lie completely outside of it, and some straddle its borders. Of course,
public international law itself has long comprised a number of particular
topics, such as the law of the sea, humanitarian law, and the rules
pertaining to foreign diplomatic and consular representatives. In the
second half of the twentieth century, several additional new specialties
have developed. The most prominent examples are, as already
mentioned, the law of international organizations and of human rights.
More recently, international criminal, environmental, refugee, and trade
law have become standard sub-topics of public international law. To be
sure, many of these new areas have matured to the point where a
thorough understanding requires studying them in their own right, not
simply as an appendix to the general law of nations. Yet, they do cluster
closely around the classic core.
This cannot be said for private international law, which has gained
enormous importance in the last few decades. Fifty years ago,
transboundary transactions and disputes between private parties were
probably exceptional enough to treat them as discreet specialties and to
leave them in the hands of a few experts. The phenomenon commonly
labeled "globalization" has changed that dramatically. The combined
effects of the internationalization of markets, the increased mobility of
persons and capital, and the age of electronic communication have turned
the private side of international law from a backwater into a vast and
highly prominent field of enormous practical importance. At the same
time, this field has diversified as well. It is now often divided into
international business transactions, corporate law, commercial
arbitration, litigation, and other subjects. All these topics lie well beyond
the territory of public international law.
There is now a panoply of areas that are impossible to assign to
either the public or private international law realm because they contain
ingredients of, and begin to transcend, both. Probably the most salient
example is European Union law, where elements of public international
law (international organizations, treaty, supremacy issues, etc.) are
inextricably intertwined with the regulation of markets and private
relationships as well as administrative and procedural matters." Here,
the blending of public and private international law has, in fact, created a
new order that is, by now, sui generis, especially since it has engendered
truly supranational law, i.e., law made and enforced by a body above
11. See GEORGE A. BERMANN, ET. AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2d ed. 2002).
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sovereign nation states and binding upon them. Other mixed areas range
from the regulation of cyberspace to international investment and
intellectual property regimes. At least in terms of their practical
relevance, these hybrids no longer linger at the margin of the
international law universe but present core transboundary issues:
2. The Growing Complexity of the Global Legal Order
The rise of these new areas has not only broadened the range of
international legal issues, it has also changed the character of the world
legal order. In particular, it has rendered this order much more complex
than it was even a generation ago. This is most visible in the emergence
of new actors, sources, principles, and tribunals.
Legal actors in international law have become more numerous and
diverse than ever. To begin with, this is true for the two categories
considered by classic public international law: states and international
organizations. States have become a much larger and more heterogenous
group as a result of de-colonization and the break-up of former
federations such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Today, Third
World countries leave the Western industrial states in the minority and
present a challenge to the traditional international law regime originally
created by the European powers. Intergovernmental organizations have
multiplied as well. Fifty years ago, the United Nations and the Bretton
Woods institutions were almost the only major actors of that kind on the
world stage. Today we have to include at least the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), the Organization for Econonic Cooperation and
Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as
well as regional organizations such as the African Union, the Arab
League, the European Union (EU), the Council of Europe, the
Organization of American States (OAS) and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN).12
What is even more significant in the present context is the
multiplication and rise of non-state actors. NGOs, especially now, play a
significant role in the international legal process, particularly in lobbying
and pressuring governments and in influencing international
lawmaking.1 3  Individuals have become important players as well.
12. From 1951 to 1999, the number of intergovernmental organizations has roughly
doubled (by one count from 123 to 251). See Eric Stein, International Integration and
Democracy: No Love at First Sight, 95 AM. J. INTL. L. 489 (2001). On regional
organizations, see JAMES " HAWDON, EMERGING ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS: THE
PROLIFERATION OF REGIONAL INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE MODERN
WORLD-SYSTEM (1996).
13. From 1951 through 1999, the number of NGOs is said to have grown from 832
to 5825 or even 43,985. See Stein, supra note 12, at 491 (with further references).
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Plainly irrelevant in the classic law of nations, individuals have advanced
from mere objects of protection under humanitarian and human rights
law to actors with their own rights (e.g., to petition international human
rights bodies) and responsibilities (e.g., for crimes under international
law). The latest addition is business corporations. While their status
continues to be much disputed, 14 they, too, enjoy rights (e.g., investment
protection) and are charged with responsibilities (e.g., for environmental
damage or human rights abuses) as actors on the international scene."
The sources that shape international legal issues have multiplied and
diversified as well. Again, this is also true for the traditional categories
under classic public international law. In particular, the number of
treaties, both bilateral and multilateral, has grown exponentially. 16 They
cover an ever wider spectrum of subjects, ranging from arms control to
international sales, from human rights to service of process, and from the
protection of biodiversity to foreign investment. 7 In the meantime,
customary international law has also continued to develop.' 8 And the
number of judicial decisions rendered by international tribunals has
skyrocketed, as has the number of publications on international legal
issues.
Yet, there are also many sources that lie outside the traditional
public international law catalog. There is now a dense network of
regulatory law on the international level, issued by international
organizations and agencies such as the IMF and the World Bank, as well
as by the European Union.' 9 Moreover, as countries have become more
internationally involved, they have produced more and more (domestic)
law dealing with transboundary issues, addressing matters as far-ranging
as export and import control, asylum and refugee status, and the
domestic effects of foreign commercial activity. In this process, the
sources of private international law have become especially important.
We now have a multitude of treaties drafted under the auspices of the
14. See, e.g., Steven Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 Yale L.J. 443 (2001).
15. See, e.g., John Doe I v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-57197, 00-56628, 00-
57195, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19263 (9th Cir. 2002); see also David Weissbrodt,
Principles Relating to the Human Rights Conduct of Companies: Working Paper,
Commission of Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, 52d Sess. 16 U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200-WG.2/WP.1 (2000).
16. The United States is currently a member of approximately 14,000 international
agreements, PAUST, supra note 1, at v.
17. See, e.g., the variety of treaties reprinted in BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS (2001).
18. For an illustrative (and famous) discussion, see Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d
876 (2d Cir. 1980), especially pp. 880-885.
19. For the latter, see, for example, the materials collected in GEORGE BERMANN, ET.
AL., EUROPEAN UNION LAW, SELECTED DOCUMENTS (2002).
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Hague Conference of Private International Law, UNCITRAL, and
European Communities addressing substantive private law, choice of
law, and private international litigation.2 Additionally, there are the
practices and principles governing international business transactions
which, as a revived lex mercatoria, greatly influence international
arbitral proceedings.
2 1
The changing nature of international law is also evident in the
expansion of jurisdictional claims made by states and their institutions.
In addition to the classic paradigms of territoriality and personality, the
effects principle has become firmly established and begun to play an
enormous role. Today, the main jurisdictional battleground is no
longer just the relationship between states as such, i.e., classic public
international law territory. Instead, jurisdictional principles are most
often invoked (and contested) to justify (or attack) the regulation of
transboundary business activities, the exercise of personal jurisdiction in
private litigation, and the enforcement of criminal law beyond national
borders.
Finally, we have witnessed a tremendous proliferation of
international tribunals and dispute resolution mechanisms. Half a
century ago, nearly all the emphasis was on the newly created
International Court of Justice. Today, this court is just one among a host
of others. Again, many of the new institutions can be said to belong to
the realm of public international law proper. This is true not only for the
various human rights tribunals, i.e., the United Nations Commission of
Human Rights and the European, Inter-American, and (incipient) African
Courts of Human Rights. It is also the case for the International Criminal
Court and the UN Tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia as
well as for the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea.
Yet, as with the new actors and sources, there are also numerous
20. See, e.g., HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, COLLECTION OF
CONVENTIONS 1951-1996 (1997); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
AND ARBITRATION, SELECTED TREATIES, STATUTES AND RULES (2d ed. 2001).
21. See Francesco Galgano, The New Lex Mercatoria, 2 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP.
L. 99 (1995); Friedrich K. Juenger, The Lex Mercatoria and Private International Law,
60 LA. L. REV. 1133 (2000).
22. Moreover, the universality principle has now moved more into the limelight,
mainly as a result of the growing awareness of, and greater enforcement efforts in, the
human rights field. See, e.g, Arrest Warrant (Belg. v. Congo), 2002 I.C.J. 1 (Feb. 14
2002) (Belgian arrest warrant against former foreign minister of Congo based on
universal jurisdiction violates head-of-state immunity). See also R. v. Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 2 W.L.R. 827
(H.L. 1999) (universal jurisdiction over alleged crimes committed by former Chilean
dictator). Even the protective principle, rarely invoked a generation ago, is likely to
become a prominent issue in an age when nations are more than ever seeking to forestall
terrorist acts planned or prepared abroad.
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institutions that lie outside the purview of classic public international
law. The most salient examples are the European Court of Justice and
the dispute resolution panels of the WTO. In addition, there is a thriving
regime of international arbitration, both for disputes between investors
and states and among private businesses themselves,23 not to mention ad
hoc institutions like the Iran Claims Tribunal.24 Finally, we must not
forget the enormous practical and theoretical importance of the many
international cases adjudicated in domestic tribunals around the world,
the United States courts prominent among them.
3. The Blurring of Boundaries
In this expanding and increasingly complex world of international
law, the lines dividing the various areas have blurred more and more.
This has occurred in two major regards.
The boundary between public and private international law has
become more uncertain and less meaningful. Fifty years ago, it may
have seemed clear that public international law deals with the law,
applicable among states and intergovernmental organizations, while
private international law concerns itself with transboundary relationships
between private parties, i.e., individuals and businesses. In theory, this
remains true today, but in practice, the distinction is increasingly
pointless. As mentioned before, there are many subject matter areas that
escape the traditional classification altogether because they combine
public and private international law elements, such as European Union
law or the regulation of electronic commerce.25 Perhaps even more
important, we now live in a world in which hybrid issues arise in myriad
specific contexts: a business sues a foreign governmental entity which
promptly invokes sovereign immunity but loses because the action is
based on a commercial activity; 26 a firm invests private capital in another
country, suffers from adverse government regulation, and resorts to
ICSID arbitration;27 a citizen brings a claim for employment
discrimination and wins in the European Court of Justice because the
23. See TIBOR VARADY, ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed.
2003); W. MICHAEL REISMAN, ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
(1997).
24. On the latter, see CHARLES NELSON BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-
UNITED STATES CLAIMS TRIBUNAL (1998).
25. See discussion supra Section 11.1.
26. See, e.g., Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607 (1992).
27. International Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between
States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159
(entered into force 1966). Regarding ICSID arbitration, see CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER,
ICSID CONVENTION (2001); see also JAMES C. BAKER, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN
LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES: THE ROLE OF ICSID AND MIGA (1999).
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rejection of her job application violates European Community law;28 a
defendant sued by a foreign plaintiff moves for dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds but the court denies the motion, inter alia, because
of bilateral treaty obligations. 29 The list of examples is nearly endless.
The boundary between international and domestic law has become
less clear and rigid as well. The traditional assumption was that
international law exists between (public) international actors, i.e., states
and intergovernmental organizations, while domestic law applies (only)
within a particular jurisdiction. Of course, things were never quite so
simple in the real world. Today, however, the two areas intermingle in
so many ways that the traditional division is often outright misleading.
Which sphere defines the limits on the exercise of jurisdiction over a
foreign corporation in a suit based on acts committed abroad?3 ° Are
bribes offered to foreign officials forbidden by international or domestic
law?3 31 How do we answer the question whether the conviction of a
foreign national for a serious crime committed in the United States must
be reversed because the defendant was not informed of his right to
contact his consulate for assistance?32  Does the recognition of an
English judgment turn on the municipal rules of the forum or on
international law?33 Again, these are just examples to which others could
be added.
28. See Case 14/83, Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984
E.C.R 1891, [1986] 2 C.M.L.R. 430 (1986).
29. See Irish Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. The issue turns on both domestic (state or federal and constitutional) law and
principles of international jurisdiction as construed by domestic courts. See Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of California, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW: FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 403 (1986).
31. In the United States, the immediate prohibition is contained in the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -3 (amended 1998), but that federal statute
implements the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 ILM 1 (1998).
32. The answer depends on the American (state or federal) law of criminal
procedure, constitutional due process provisions, and the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 596 U.N.T.S. No. 8638, as interpreted by the
International Court of Justice. See Germany v. United States (LaGrand Case), 1999 I.C.J.
104.
33. That depends on where recognition is sought. In the United States it depends on
the domestic law of the respective state, possibly the UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY JUDGEMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 149 (1986), and on principles of international comity. See,
e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1972). In
Canada, it may be governed by the Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Apr. 24, 1984, T. S. No. 10
(1988) Cm 306. In other EU member states, it is determined Art. 32-52 of the Council
Regulation on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters 44/2001, 2001 OJ (L 12) 1.
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In fact, many cases today straddle both the public-private and the
international-domestic boundaries at the same time. If Peruvian citizens
sue an American corporation in a US federal court for environmental
damage inflicted in their home country, the case involves a (tort) cause
of action under private domestic law but it can be brought only if
plaintiffs show the violation of public international law required by the
Alien Tort Claims Act. 34 Similarly, if a Chinese buyer sues an American
seller for breach of contract, we have a private action based on an
international treaty, which has the rank and effect of federal law. 35 And
if an American plaintiff brings a product liability action against a French
corporation in Federal District Court, we have private litigation in
domestic courts in which the plaintiffs right to obtain documents under
the defendant's control depends on the interpretation of an international
convention.36
To be sure, none of this means that a grasp of the basic distinction
between public and private international law and between the
international and the domestic legal order is not helpful. In fact, such a
grasp may very well be crucial, e.g., in order to gauge the force of
particular rules and to understand who has the power to change them.
But we must recognize that, in practice, these spheres cannot be neatly
separated and that many issues cannot be resolved unless we consider
how pieces taken from all of them fit together and interact.
III. The Current Curriculum: The Limits of Adjustment
Under such circumstances, is the public international law course
still an appropriate introduction to the international curriculum? With
regard to the classic version described above,37 the answer is an easy no.
Most teachers and scholars would agree that in today's world, a pure
law-of-nations approach is an anachronism. Yet, with regard to the
teaching of international law as it stands today, the answer is not quite so
obvious.
The teaching materials, both casebooks and textbooks, offered in
the early twenty-first century take many of the changes that have
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1789); see Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140 (2d
Cir. 2003).
35. Unless the parties excluded its application under Art. 6, the dispute will be
governed by the United Nations Convention for the International Sale of Goods of 1980
(CISG), 15 U.S.C. App. § 52 (1997), to which both the United States and China are
parties.
36. The Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Mar. 17, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 (1970); see
Socirt6 Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 482 U.S.
522 (1987).
37. See discussion supra Section I.
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occurred in the last fifty years into account, albeit to varying degrees. In
terms of new areas, they mostly include human rights, international
criminal, environmental, and economic law. With regard to actors, all
books consider individuals, almost all mention NGOs, and a growing
number even addresses the role of corporations in international law. The
catalog of sources has remained more traditional, although some works
pay attention to norms created by NGOs and other actors. When it
comes to dispute resolution mechanisms, the existing literature routinely
covers at least some elements of international human rights adjudication,
often discusses the WTO institutions, and sometimes even mentions the
European Court of Justice. In addition, several books consider the
increased interrelatedness between public international law and other
areas. 38 Taken together, these adjustments have considerably broadened
and modernized the teaching of public international law.
Yet, while this modernization has rendered the basic course more
acceptable than the classic version, it is still not a suitable general
introduction to the international curriculum. The principal reason is that
all these amendments and updates have not changed the fundamental
character of the course. It remains, at heart, a course on public
international law, whether that label is used or not.39 Even if the classic
model is no longer all that is being taught, it continues to characterize the
core meaning, to determine the bulk of the content, and to shape the
basic character of the exercise today. As a result, the current (public)
international law course still suffers from three major shortcomings when
used for introductory purposes.
First, the compass of the basic course is still too confined. It
continues to cover only part of the relevant territory. Most importantly,
even a somewhat enlarged (public) international law syllabus normally
still omits virtually all of private international law, although there seem
to be some (limited) exceptions. 40  As mentioned, this omission may
38. This is the theme emphasized by: CARTER, supra note 1, at xxxv-xxxvii; PAUST,
supra note 1, at v. It is also implicit in the overall design in DUNOFF, supra note 1.
39. The term International Law has become more common. But see BUERGENTHAL,
supra note 1; see also PAUST, supra note 1, at v ("international law, sometimes referred
to as Public International Law").
40. CARTER, supra note 1, covers a fair amount of private international law topics,
such as: international (commercial) arbitration, at 339-399; international recognition of
civil judgments, at 418-420; international jurisdiction to adjudicate, at 728-733; and
choice of law, at 733-742. JANIS,.supra note 1, at 317-347, 715-779, also address aspects
of private international law in the (narrow) sense of conflict of laws. DUNOFF, supra note
1, presents a considerable number of public-private hybrid areas in some detail, including
for example: foreign direct investment, at 70-100; the role of corporations, at 206-225;
and legal aspects of the world economy, at 777-821. PAUST, supra note 1, at 713-738
briefly discusses some aspects of cooperation in international (private and other)
litigation.
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have been acceptable fifty years ago when that area was still of limited
importance. Today, when private international law issues have become
so routine that few lawyers can avoid them, leaving the private law side
out of an introduction to international legal studies borders on
educational malpractice. Moreover, even where particular recent
developments are reflected in the teaching literature, most current
international law materials treat the newer topics and issues as mere
addenda to the traditional core and thus very briefly.41 To be sure, it is
not intrinsically wrong for a public international law casebook to devote
only a few pages (out of a thousand or more) to matters such as NGOs,
corporations or the European Court of Justice, but it strongly suggests
that topics lying beyond the more traditional orbit often receive scant
attention in the classroom as well, if they are not omitted altogether for
lack of time or teacher interest.
Second, using public international law, however amended, as a
general introduction conveys a lopsided view of the international system.
There may be "good reasons for maintaining the traditional focus on
interstate relations and institutions, 42 in an advanced course in public
international law but for purposes of an introduction to the global legal
order, such a restricted focus is misplaced. Students will easily get the
impression that international legal issues typically concern states, are
matters merely for international organizations, or arise just in areas such
as human rights, the law of the sea or perhaps before the WTO. At least
in everyday practice, however, the reality is different. Most practitioners
have little to do with any of these areas. Of course, there are numerous
public international law elements, which are often relevant even to the
non-specialist lawyer, ranging from the force and interpretation of
treaties in domestic courts to international jurisdiction principles and
sovereign immunity. Yet practitioners are likely to face these elements
in conjunction with private international law issues, i.e., in contexts
which most public international law courses fail to address: e.g, how to
set up a corporate subsidiary abroad or negotiate an international
licensing agreement; how to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign defendant
or defend a lawsuit brought by a foreign plaintiff; how to choose or avoid
international commercial arbitration or to ensure compliance with a
bilateral investment treaty.
41. See, e.g., BEDERMAN, supra note 1, at 62-63 (dealing with NGOs in barely one
page); BUERGENTHAL, supra note 1, at 59-65, 218-220 (addressing the European Union in
five pages, NGOs in barely one page, and international in personam jurisdiction in two
pages); CARTER, supra note 1, at 137-142, 322-328, 728-742 (devoting but a few pages to
the role of corporations, the European Court of Justice, and international conflict of laws.
DAMROSCH, supra note 1, at 421-425 (discussing corporations in five pages).
42. DAMROSCH, supra note 1, at xix.
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In short, there is a considerable disjunction between a pure public
international law introduction and the professional needs of the majority
of our graduates. This disjunction has two deleterious effects. The more
obvious harm is that such an introduction poorly prepares our students
for most of the work they will actually have to do. The more subtle
impact, however, is that it discourages students from pursuing
international legal studies altogether. If a basic course creates the (false)
impression that such studies are mainly about principles of state
responsibility, the UN Convention on the Law of Treaties or the voting
structure in the UN Security Council, the whole field begins to look
rather exotic: full of interesting global issues but quite irrelevant to most
lawyers' professional lives. Thus, an initial exposure to public
international law alone, meant to draw students into the field, becomes
counterproductive and discourages them from undertaking studies that
can actually be highly relevant for their future work.
Third, an introduction through public international law presents
legal issues too much in isolation from each other. To be sure, some of
the current casebooks try to avoid such isolationism. 43 Many others,
however, make little effort in that direction. Thus they are bound to
create, or at least to reinforce, the impression that public international
law can be neatly separated from private international law on the one
hand, and from the domestic legal order on the other. 4 Yet, in a world
where hybrid areas have gained enormous importance and hybrid issues
are becoming routine, it is important, particularly for an introductory
course, to pervasively emphasize the blurring of lines between the
traditional subjects as well as the constant need to draw on public and
private as well as international and domestic law at the same time.
Despite all its changes, the standard international law course has
remained too narrow, lopsided, and isolated to serve as a general basis
for the international law curriculum. Its "Law-of-Nations Plus"
approach 45 cannot adequately introduce students to a world in which
public and private international law are equally important and in which
43. CARTER, supra note 1, at xxxvii.
44. See, e.g., DAMROSCH, at xix-xx ("International law is a conceptually distinct and
self-contained system of law" and "International law is a discrete, comprehensive, legal
system").
45. This is not a polemical phrase I invented for present purposes but the way many
leading public international law scholars conceive of their subject, and correctly so. See,
e.g., BUERGENTHAL, supra note 1, at 2 (international law today is "still considered to be
principally the law governing the relations between states"); BEDERMAN, supra note 1, at
v ("International law is the law of nations" but can also be applied in other contexts);
BLAKESLEY, supra note 1, at v ("public international law is still principally the study of
the law concerning the relations among sovereign nation states"); see also DAMROSCH,
supra note 1, at xix; SLOMANSON, supra note 1, at 3.
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both mix and mingle, often to the point where the whole distinction
becomes dysfunctional.
Still, couldn't the international law course become a proper
introduction if it were just further broadened and updated? Wouldn't
including private international law, putting equal emphasis on non-
traditional topics, and taking greater account of the needs in legal
practice today suffice? The main problem with such a strategy is that it
would make the international law course impossibly bulky. By adding
many of the recent developments to the traditional menu, the quantity of
materials currently included has already grown enormously.46 Adding an
equal amount of private international law, giving hybrid topics room
equivalent to their practical relevance, and fully emphasizing the
interplay between the various areas would lead beyond all reasonable
limits. It is simply not possible adequately to cover traditional public
international law plus private international law plus all the hybrid areas
and their complex interrelationship in a basic course. To be sure, one
might broaden the coverage and at the same time reduce the material
addressed in each field to a manageable amount. The result, however,
would no longer be the traditional course in amended form but
something quite different. Yet, if we really need something different in
order to lay sufficiently broad foundations, we might as well stop
messing with the public international law course, take the plunge, and
design an entirely new introduction.
IV. The Need for a New Foundation: A Course on Transnational Law
We should create a new basic course that is not skewed in favor of a
particular side of the global legal order'but provides a general overview
of the whole terrain. Today, this is particularly important. In an age in
which most lawyers sooner or later face transboundary issues, students
need a realistic chance to learn the indispensible minimum with
reasonable effort. The majority, who may have no desire to specialize in
international law, will take, at best, one course in this area; this should be
a course that provides them with a broad introduction to the variety of
international legal issues that shape the world in which they live and that
arise in practice today. The minority who do wish to specialize in
international legal matters ought to get a sense of the general picture and
learn the basics first; they can then choose more wisely among the
bewildering variety of advanced topics offered.47  In fact, these
46. Most of the casebooks listed, supra note 1, run from about 1000 to 1600 pages.
47. There is a long and growing list of specialized courses offered in many law
schools that deal with a panoply of special topics. The existing casebooks alone cover
not only (public) international law as such but also international arbitration, business
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considerations strongly suggest that all students should be required to
take such an introductory course although that is an issue in its own right
beyond the scope of this essay.48
The ultimate goal of such an introduction should thus be to convey
the minimum knowledge about, and understanding of, transboundary
legal issues that every lawyer should command and that every advanced
international course may fairly presuppose. In order to accomplish these
tasks, the course must be broad enough to expose students to the basics
of both public and private international law as well as to the major hybrid
forms we face today. It must present a balanced and realistic overall
picture of the complexities of the global legal order. And it must
emphasize the overlap and interconnection of elements drawn from
various areas. To create such a course is a serious challenge. It takes
teamwork, experimentation, and time. The challenge is not so much
scholarly, but didactic. The main problem is that in order to accomplish
its mission, the discourse must remain on the introductory level, yet not
create a misleading picture. It needs to be broad without turning shallow,
digestible without becoming simplistic, and selective without omitting
essentials.
.Given its broad scope, such a course can only be a primer. This
requires that we be highly selective in the choice of materials. We must
not only eschew most special problems and details, leaving them to more
advanced courses; we must also be ready to omit all the subtopics that
we do not consider crucial at the introductory level. This does not mean
that the course should be purely practice oriented. Instead, it ought to go
beyond what is professionally indispensible and also include themes of
general educational value and broad geopolitical importance, such as the
current world trade regime, salient issues in the human rights field, or a
discussion of the use of force in the fight against terrorism.
What should such a course look like more concretely? At a
minimum, it needs to deal with the major actors (state and non-state), the
most salient sources (of public and private international law) and their
effect in the domestic legal order, the leading principles (especially of
international jurisdiction and cooperation), and the most important
dispute resolution mechanisms (again, both public and private) on the
current international scene. Students should eventually see these
elements interacting with each other, e.g., within select concrete contexts
transactions, criminal law, environmental law, human rights, intellectual property,
litigation, sales, tax, trade, as well as European Union law, and other topics. This
embarrassment of riches already proffers more than any student can ever hope to learn,
and it keeps growing.
48. For the reasons that persuaded the University of Michigan Law School faculty to
make such a course mandatory, see the references listed supra note 2.
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such as a tort suit for human rights violations, a criminal prosecution for
genocide, or a transboundary business transaction.
Since such a course would be a very broadly conceived introduction
to international law one could simply call it that. Yet, since the term
international law has long come to mean public international law, it may
be better to give a new course another name. The most appropriate title
may very well be the one suggested by Philip Jessup in his Storr's
lectures delivered at Yale half a century ago. Already then, Jessup
wanted international legal studies "to include all law which regulates
actions or events that transcend national frontiers" and thus proposed to
call the subject "Transnational Law., 49
If such a Transnational Law course serves as the general
introduction to the international curriculum, what happens to the public
international law course? It is certainly not rendered obsolete. It simply
no longer tries to perform the introductory function it cannot adequately
perform anymore. Instead, it becomes one of the specialized courses in
the international curriculum. Thus it certainly retains its significance as
the course on the law of nations, international institutions, and related
matters, as an ever more important element of a well-rounded legal
education, and probably also as a particular intellectual challenge. In
fact, the course will probably benefit from such a change of role because
it would no longer have to serve two poorly compatible functions at the
same time: to introduce to basics and to analyze in-depth. Being freed
of the former task, it can become a truly advanced enterprise. Teachers
can then build on the foundations of the introductory course and thus
gain time for the more profound treatment that public international law
deserves in light of its importance both in the curriculum and in the
world.
49. PHILIP JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 2 (1956). Very much like the course
suggested here, Jessup called for broad coverage: "Both public and private international
law are included, as are other rules which do not wholly fit such standard categories." Id.
His view of international studies encompassed state as well as non-state actors, business
as well as administrative and political affairs, negotiation as well as litigation.
It is no coincidence that the casebook by HENRY STEINER, ET. AL., TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL PROBLEMS (4th ed. 1994) pursues roughly the same idea: it was inspired by
Jessup's approach. See id. at iii. Whether it is well-suited for the purpose advocated
here, i.e., for a general introduction to the international curriculum, is another question
that would require a full-fledged discussion in its own right. Suffice it to say that despite
its age, it appears to fit such an introductory course better than most (public) international
law casebooks.
The term "transnationalism" was also used by Koh, supra note 10, at 2624, to
describe international law from the 1970s onward. An integrated approach to the specific
area of international business transactions is presented in DETLEV VAGTS, ET. AL.,
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (3d ed. 2003).
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Conclusion
In an age of ubiquitously increasing specialization, any generalist
agenda requires some courage-to stick to basics, to keep things simple,
even to risk superficiality. Yet, at a time when transboundary issues of
all sorts lurk behind every corner, it is imperative that our students
understand the general shape and nature of the international forest as a
whole, not only of a part or of individual trees. If a truly introductory
Transnational Law course provides students with an overall sense of
orientation and with a grasp of the basic building blocks, they can then
learn the specifics in more advanced courses (including public
international law) and perhaps even on their own when the need arises.5°
Without such a sense and grasp, however, our students as future lawyers
must remain confused by the growing complexity of the global legal
order and prone to commit the kind of blunders that malpractice
insurance is all about.
50. This is, after all, the idea underlying the first-year courses with regard to the
whole law school curriculum. It should be the idea underlying an introduction to the
international curriculum as well.

